The revolution in retailing: From market driven to market driving by KUMAR, Nirmalya
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
12-1997
The revolution in retailing: From market driven to
market driving
Nirmalya KUMAR
Singapore Management University, nirmalyak@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-6301(97)00068-X
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Marketing Commons, and the Sales and Merchandising Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
KUMAR, Nirmalya. The revolution in retailing: From market driven to market driving. (1997). Long Range Planning. 30, (6), 830-835.
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5182
The Revolution in Retailing: from 
Market Driven to Market Driving 
Nirmalya Kumar 
From Fragmentation to 
Consolidation 
Retailing was a very fragmented industry in most 
countries 25 years ago. Through internal growth as 
well as mergers and acquisitions, an enormous con- 
solidation has taken place in the industry. Over the 
past year, Metro of Germany has become the second 
largest retailer in the world after adding Kaufhof, 
Asko, Deutsche SB-Kauf to their portfolio. The result 
is that Metro's sales in 1996 were 57.4 billion dollars 
worldwide,  up three-fold, from 18.8 billion dollars in 
1990. Besides there have been several cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. Royal Ahold of Netherlands 
has been one of the most active on this front with their 
acquisitions of Stop and Shop, Bi-Lo, Giant, Tops, 
Finast, Edwards among others in the USA and most 
recently Bom Preco, a 50 store grocery chain, in 
Brazil. 
These mergers and acquisition are driven by several 
factors. 
1. Strong retailers because of their cash management  
system of cash sales to customers while buying on 
credit from suppliers are sitting on heaps of cash. 
2. Retailers feel that size brings them bargaining 
power versus suppliers, and therefore, helps 
reduce what for many retailers is their biggest 
expense--COGS or cost of goods sold. 
3. There are the more traditional economies of scale. 
If the same products are available through several 
retailers, then cost control becomes one of the, if 
not the, paramount driver of profitability. 
4. Many developed countries have strict restrictions 
on opening large new stores (e.g. Spain, Italy, and 
Japan), over-stored environments (e.g. France, Ger- 
many), or lack of availability of prime locations of 
adequate size (e.g., Switzerland) leaving mergers 
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Consolidation has several implications for both 
manufacturers and retailers. It makes it much  harder 
tor the independent  retailers to succeed as they just 
cannot buy as efficiently or invest enough in tech- 
nology to keep their operations competitive. Thus 
despite the efforts of many governments to protect the 
small, independent  retailer, we will continue to see 
M&A activity in the industry moving at a hectic pace. 
For manufacturers this continuing consolidation in 
points of sale is worrying. As retailers learn how to 
integrate their mergers and acquisitions more tightly, 
especially with respect to sourcing, the pressure on 
manufacturers will undoubtedly  increase. Many of 
the premier manufacturers who were previously 
operating as branded bulldozers have now been 
shocked into talking 'partnerships. '  However, part- 
nerships often mean very different things to manu- 
facturers and retailers thereby leaving one party 
rather unsatisfied with the entire experience, usually 
t }n~ manufacturer.  
From Local to Global 
Perhaps the most dramatic change in retailing has 
been the increasing globalization of retailers. Several 
factors are driving globalization including: low 
growth in domestic markets, sophisticated formats 
that have the potential to be unleashed around the 
world, the availability of technology to help manage 
far flung operations, global consumption patterns, 
and the opening up of new markets with relatively 
under-developed retail sectors. On the last point, con- 
sider that in India with a population of almost 1 
billion over 95% of retail sales are through inde- 
pendent  owner-operated stores or what are referred 
to in the United States as 'morn and pop' operations. 
Even in more developed countries or regions, such as 
Greece, Eastern Europe, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, and 
South Korea these independent  operations still 
account for a large percentage of the total retail sales. 
No wonder,  the Wal-Mart's, Carrefour's, and Makro's 
of the world get misty-eyed when  they talk about 
globalization. 
The early leaders in global retailing were specialty 
formats such as IKEA from Sweden, C&A from The 
Netherlands, Benetton of Italy, Marks and Spencer, 
and several McDonalds type franchise operations 
from the USA. These were mostly private label for- 
mats and it was not clear whether  their primary 
activity was retailing or manufacturing. Furthermore, 
the economic model and business system of these 
retailers was such that they could break even in a 
country with as few as one or two stores. Now one 
observes true retailers such as Carrefour, Dairy Farm 
of Hong Kong, Seven-Eleven convenience stores 
(part of Ito-Yokado) of Japan, Makro of Netherlands, 
Toys'R'Us, Virgin and Wal-Mart going overseas with 
their formats carrying manufacturer  branded pro- 
ducts. Since the merchandise they offer is often 
already available, one of the main distinctive com- 
petencies they bring is distribution exellence. How- 
ever, a certain min imum number of stores (6 to 8) 
in a country are necessary before their distribution 
efficiency can be successfully replicated. 
Despite the popularity of globalization in retailing, 
most retailers are still struggling to develop com- 
petencies to succeed in global markets. To what extent 
should the 'original' format be adapted is a major 
issue. Wal-Mart learnt this the hard way when its 
initial entry into China had the wrong merchandise. 
On the other hand, Mexican customers were dis- 
appointed when they did not find enough imported 
US merchandise in the Wal-Mart stores. Another 
related question is which activities should be cen- 
tralized and which should be decentralized. 
Currently, retailers believe that activities where sub- 
stantial economies of scale exist such as mer- 
chandising systems, information technology and 
vendor management should be centralized whilst 
others such as merchandising and distribution should 
be decentralized. To protect against currency fluc- 
tuations, comply with local sourcing requirements 
and serve local tastes, most 'big' retail formats prefer 
to rely on local suppliers. However, if 90% of mer- 
chandise is locally sourced, as is the case for Wal- 
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Mart and Carrefour, then these retailers start to lose 
some of their global sourcing leverage against the 
manufacturers and advantage against local compe- 
tition. Finally, as local partners are often mandated 
or necessary, who to select and what should be the 
role of each partner is a crucial question. Clearly, 
Carrefour as the late entrant in Mexico ended up with 
a relatively weaker local partner because Wal-Mart 
already had Cifra, the best Mexican retailer, tied up 
in a joint venture. 
Most manufacturers are still in the process of 
developing a coherent strategy on how to interact 
effectively with global retailers. To what  extent can 
price differences of 40-60% between markets be sus- 
tained in the face of transshipments by retailers? How 
to keep the traditional retailers who still account for 
a large majority of the manufacturer 's  sales in a par- 
ticular country satisfied while serving the global 
retailer who undercuts  established prices to gain 
local market share? How to organize and compensate 
a dedicated multinational-multifunctional account 
management team to serve global retailers? These are 
all as yet unresolved questions. 
From Merchants to Retail Brand 
Managers 
Retailers were once considered true merchants, mak- 
ing their profits from the spread between their buying 
and selling prices. Today's most successful retailers 
are not just excellent merchants but  they are develop- 
ing a unique powerful  brand image. This is true both 
for retailers who carry primarily private label mer- 
chandise such as Aldi of Germany, Gap and Pier 1 
Imports of United States or Zara of Spain as well as for 
the more traditional retailers who carry manufacturer 
branded products. While in the United States, the 
retailers' own private labels tend to be cheaper than 
the manufacturer 's  branded products,  this is not 
always the case in Europe. Supermarkets such as 
Sainsbury of United Kingdom, MIGROS of Swit- 
zerland, Albert Heijn of Netherlands and Casino of 
France have developed premium private labels which 
are highly respected vis-a-vis the manufacturers '  
brands. These retailers support  their own brands with 
extensive advertising, product  innovation and attract- 
ive packaging to develop a distinct brand image and 
customer franchise. For example, in almost every sur- 
vey in the United Kingdom, Marks and Spencer tends 
to top the list of most admired companies and their St. 
Michael 's brand is world renowned. Retailers believe 
that their own labels deliver greater profits, more con- 
trol, increased leverage vis-a-vis the manufacturer, 
and that they help to develop a distinct store image 
among the clutter of over-distributed manufacturer 
branded products. 
While private labels may look very seductive for 
the retailer, mass retailers have to be careful not to 
overdo it. For a mass retailer, customer count and 
traffic are crucial issues. Having too many private 
labels can turn off many, especially younger, 
customers. Despite having in Kenmore and Craftsman 
two of the most respected brands in the market place, 
Sears, the US department store, had to move away 
from their private label only policy in white goods 
and hardware. Some of Sainsbury's problems and 
recent loss of market leadership to Tesco in United 
Kingdom can also be traced to their over-reliance on 
private labels which made Sainsbury's customers feel 
that they lacked adequate choice. 
The experience of MIGROS, the market share leader 
in supermarkets in Switzerland, offers two other les- 
sons to retailers for private labels. First, by focusing 
on their own brands which account for more than 
90% of their sales, they have provided their com- 
petitors with a strategic window to operate in. There 
is little doubt  that MIGROS is by far the best retailer 
in Switzerland and that their competit ion is, to put it 
bluntly, inept. Yet the competit ion has almost 60% 
market share as they offer manufacturer branded 
products such as Coca Cola which MIGROS still re- 
fuses to carry. Second, it is more difficult for mass 
retailers such as MIGROS who rely on private labels 
to expand overseas as they have to convince the cus- 
tomers in the new country to switch both stores and 
brands. And if they do decide to carry manufacturer 
branded products in overseas markets, they do not 
have the same leverage with brand manufacturers that 
other retailers do. 
A strong retailer brand supported by advertising 
has a positive impact on recruitment of managerial 
talent and employees.  By virtue of their strong brand 
image, many European retailers can successfully com- 
pete with the major brand manufacturers for mana- 
gerial talent, something that I found was relatively 
rare in the United States. For manufacturers this 
means that, unlike in the past, their counterparts in 
the retail sector are better informed and more ana- 
lytical while having the same educational and social 
status. One can guess the implications of this for 
manufacturer-retailer negotiations. The improving 
quality of private labels implies that manufacturers 
have to invest more in product  innovation while keep- 
ing the price differential under control. 
From Traditional Stores to 
Innovative Formats 
The past 25 years has seen the emergence and growth 
of several new retail formats and concepts. Today, we 
The Revolution in Retailing: from Market Driven to Market Driving 
see the supermarket,  department store, hypermarket  
and supercenter,  discount store, cash and carry ware- 
house club, factory outlets, category killer, con- 
venience store, specialty retailer, as well as the gas 
station all competing for the same customer. 
Undoubtedly, of all the formats, the 'big box' (category 
killers, large discount stores, warehouse clubs and 
bypermarkets) have had the most revolutionary 
impact. Their enormous purchasing power which 
results in lower cost of goods sold and economies of 
scale puts severe pressure on the traditional formats. 
Department stores in several countries have either 
eliminated or severely cut back on their toy depart- 
ment in the face of competit ion from Toys'R'Us. The 
independent  car dealer in the United States and 
United Kingdom now faces the emergence of category 
killers such as Car Max and Car Supermarkets respec- 
tively who compete for the profitable used car busi- 
D_ f,*SS. 
Clearly, in the future the Internet will rev- 
olutionalize retailing in the developed world. The 
Amazon bookstore which sells books through the 
lnternet only is a prime example of the revolutionary 
potential of Internet. In contrast to the traditional 
book industry which is drowning itself in excess 
inventory because it cannot develop an effective 
returns policy, Amazon carries no stocks as the books 
~lre shipped directly from the book wholesalers. As a 
result Amazon incurs close to zero inventory and real 
estate costs while potentially reaching customers 
across the world. Furthermore, they offer customers 
~t much  wider assortment, lower prices, quicker 
access to newly released books, and no-travel hassle- 
flee home shopping compared to the high street book- 
store. A new development,  'intelligent shopping 
agents' which rapidly search the Internet for the low- 
('.st price on a product are also slowing emerging. If 
they become widespread, retailers may face greater 
price pressure in categories where the customer does 
not need to feel, see or touch, and where the customer 
d~es not desire instantaneous delivery (unless the 
product can be downloaded). The retailer's com- 
p~titive focus will shift from the marketplace to the 
marketspace. 
The traditional formats, especially the supermarket 
and department store, with their high costs will see 
more and more customers flee to these new formats 
in search for better value. To justify their higher costs, 
supermarkets and department stores have to find 
w~ys to increase the value they provide to the 
customer. Perhaps this may be through higher cus- 
tomization in their services, unique assortments, 
and/or  creating a boutique (e.g. shop within a shop) 
specialty feeling. If traditional stores carry similar 
assortments as these new lower-cost formats and 
delivery innovations negate their locational advan- 
tage, they cannot compete on product and price. Their 
only hope is to deliver a unique experience as Body 
Shop, F.A.O Schwartz, Starbucks, Nordstrom or 
Banana Republic do. 
The new formats offer both new opportunities and 
challenges for manufacturers. Which of these new 
formats to enter and when? How to develop dis- 
tinctive offers for each type of format? How to manage 
intra-brand competition? Some manufacturers, such 
as in the automobile industry, are behaving like 
ostriches burying their heads in the sand. They are 
refusing to support and deal with the new category 
killers. Others like Goodyear Tire and Rubber Com- 
pany who have decided to distribute their products 
through mass merchandisers after years of exclus- 
ively relying on independent  dealers have upset the 
latter. As the market moves in the direction of the 
new formats, leading manufacturers have little choice 
but to enter these outlets forcefully. Smaller manu- 
facturers may, however, develop a distinctive market 
positioning through an exclusive focus on the tra- 
ditional formats. 
From Unsophisticated to 
Technology Intensive 
Surprisingly to many, retailing has become a tech- 
nologically intensive industry. Technology is trans- 
forming how retailers (1) configure the supply chain; 
(2) manage their store operations; and (3) interact with 
customers. By establishing close links with their sup- 
pliers, retailers can utilize ECR (efficient consumer 
response). ECR allows suppliers to receive daily 
updates of sales, prices and inventories by item and 
by store. Thus the entire value chain can work on 
the principle of 'sell one, ship one, build one.' The 
potential cost savings for the supermarket industry in 
inventory, order processing, invoicing and payment 
from such a system are estimated at 30 billion dollars 
in the USA and 33 billion dollars in Europe. Fur- 
thermore out-of-stocks, inventory and returns can all 
be simultaneously reduced. 
Technology also makes it easier to manage thou- 
sands of stores spread all over the world and helps 
the expansion of retailers like Wal-Mart, Home Depot 
and Toys 'R' Us. Real time information from the stores 
keeps the headquarters informed of what is hap- 
pening in each store. Within the store, sophisticated 
shelf management programs aid merchandising to 
make the shelves easier to shop for the consumer 
while maximizing profits for the retailer. 
Plummeting data processing and storage costs give 
retailers today the ability to track their customers on 
an individual basis. Who is buying what, when,  and 
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for how much? This allows retailers to customize their 
offers at individual  stores and to individual  
customers. As retailers learn who the most profitable 
customers are, we will observe more targeted cus- 
tomer attraction strategies. There is a lot of untapped 
potential with respect to such customer data which  
retailers are still learning to exploit. Clearly, however,  
there are privacy concerns in every country and legal 
restrictions in several countries, such as Denmark, 
which have to be respected. 
Increasing technological sophistication means that 
today's retailer is much better informed about con- 
sumer purchasing patterns. Retailers who do not or 
are unable to invest in such systems will be at a dis- 
advantage. And manufacturers, in their negotiations 
with retailers, will need to demonstrate the role that 
their brand plays in the category for the retailer as 
well as the profits that it will generate for the retailer. 
Shelf space according to movement  implies that 
manufacturers must earn the shelf space that is dedi- 
cated to them. 
From Vulnerable to Powerful 
Players 
Historically, retailers used to be at the mercy of 
powerful  multinational manufacturers such as Unil- 
ever, Nestle and Procter and Gamble. Today some 
retailers find themselves much bigger in size than 
their suppliers, and size brings power. For example, 
Unilever, the largest packaged goods company, had 
sales of just over 50 billion dollars last year but  that 
is still less than half of Wal-Mart's sales of 106 billion 
dollars. 
In response to this shift in power, many manu- 
facturers are allocating a larger proportion of their 
marketing expenditures to trade promotion instead of 
advertising. This is a self-defeating strategy. While 
retailers derive their power  from size and market 
access, a manufacturer must  derive its power  from 
advertising and product  innovation investments in 
brand equity. If a retailer does not stock a particular 
brand and the customer walks out of the store, the 
manufacturer has the power. On the other hand, if 
the customer accepts an alternative brand, then the 
retailer has the power. This is something that even 
the largest retailer, Wal-Mart, understands.  Manu- 
facturers who under-invest  in brand equity lose 
power  to retailers, spend more on trade promotion, 
offer price and service concessions, thereby getting 
trapped in a vicious circle. 
Some manufacturers and retailers are starting to see 
the benefits of developing trust and focusing on the 
benefits that partnerships can bring to both parties 
instead of using their power  to pummel  the other 
party into submission. Experienced manufacturers 
now realize that with some retailers, for example 
Sainsbury, it will always be a power  struggle. 
However,  there are other retailers, for example Tesco, 
with whom one can develop a partnership that 
focuses on maximizing joint benefits. Manufacturers 
increasingly have to develop account management 
systems that can function differently in different 
types of relationships, which is difficult. 
Conclusion 
These changes are dramatic for the retailing industry. 
Retailers have always been a more market driven than 
manufacturers because they were smaller, more flex- 
ible and closer to the marketplace. A retailer who was 
not market driven received immediate feedback from 
customers and had to either adapt or went  out of 
business. Today, however,  there are several retailers 
like Ahold, Amazon, Bed, Bath, and Beyond, Benne- 
ton, Body Shop, Carrefour, Car Max, Hermes and Mau- 
ritz, Home Depot, IKEA, Makro, Seven-Eleven, 
Victoria's Secret, Wal-Mart and Zara who are chan- 
ging the retail landscape and driving customers'  shop- 
ping behavior and habits. Wal-Mart, for example, has 
taught consumers not to shop around for sales and 
instead buy at everyday low prices from them. 
The best retailers today are using available tech- 
nology and new formats to re-invent the competitive 
retail marketspace. Wal-Mart has a strategy of using 
technology and systems to lower its gross margins 
constantly. This drives its competitors bankrupt. 
Every one of the top 10 US discounters in 1962, the 
year that Wal-Mart opened its first store, has either 
gone out of business or reorganized. Similarly, Car 
Supermarkets, the used car category killer in the 
United Kingdom, operates with a gross margin of 5% 
and sells cars below book value. This changes the 
rules of the game for existing players who are trapped 
because of their high cost business systems. 
These revolutionary retailers are also reconfiguring 
the value chain. They are using their power  to demand 
changes from powerful manufacturers and driving the 
manufacturer 's pricing, product,  promotion and sales 
strategies. Procter and Gamble, for example, has 
adopted EDLP (everyday low pricing), eliminated sev- 
eral brands and item variations, reduced trade and 
consumer promotions, controlled new product  intro- 
ductions, as well as reorganized the salesforce from 
being dedicated to one of the seven separate divisions 
to being part of unified teams dedicated to individual 
retail accounts. All these changes have been in 
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response to demands from retailers, especially 
Wal-Mart. Therefore I believe that the term 'market 
driving' is more descriptive of these retailers than 
'market driven.' 
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